We report the results of an experimental study of production decisions in an environment with dynamic costs of pollution and climate change. Every period, agents simultaneously decide on own level of production that generates private production revenue and emissions. Emissions lead to pollution which acts as a public bad and accumulates over time. Our main treatment variable is the emission propensity of agent's production technology, resulting in three treatments: homogeneous baseline, heterogeneous with low pollution propensity and heterogeneous with high pollution propensity. We characterize and use as benchmarks for observed behavior the Markov perfect equilibrium and social optimum. We find that the observed production allocations are between the Markov perfect equilibrium and social optimum. With experience, the strongest adjustment and lowest level of pollution is achieved in the heterogeneous treatment with high emission propensity. When the costs of pollution and climate change are not severe, institutions are most necessary to create incentives for environmentally friendly behavior. JEL classification codes: C90, Q54, C72, Q50, Q01, C61.
Introduction
Recent years witnessed an increased interest of policy makers, researchers, and the general public in the local and global effects of the environmental damage and climate change. In its Fourth Assessment Report (2007) In its Synthesis Report, the conference organizers described the current situation as following or exceeding the worst-case scenarios predicted by the IPCC. The report also stated that "societies are highly vulnerable to even modest levels of climate change, with poor nations and communities particularly at risk."
The economic and social impact of changes in climate and environmental quality has been acknowledged and evaluated in a number of studies.
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One of the important aspects of environmental damage and climate change is its dynamic and slowly reversible nature. A recent study led by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Solomon et al. 2010) reports that even if all carbon dioxide emissions stop now, the changes in temperatures, rainfall, and sea levels will not be reversible for the next 1,000 years.
Pollution is an example of negative externality imposed on all members of the society, or a public bad, and hence poses a social dilemma-type problem. A number of institutional arrangements targeting greenhouse gas emissions have been proposed and implemented. Some regional institutions, such as the European Union Emission Trading System or the sulfur dioxide trading system under the Clean Air Act in the U.S., are relatively successful (see, however, Becker and Henderson 2000) . At the same time it has been widely recognized that international agreements, such as the Kyoto treaty, posted insufficient results (see, e.g., Nordhaus 2006) . One of the reasons is the conflict between developed and developing nations, with the latter having limited access to clean technologies and unwilling to jeopardize their economic growth. Thus, technological heterogeneity of players is one of the challenges such global agreements face. Deschênes and Greenstone (2007) estimated the impact of fluctuations in precipitation level and weather conditions on agricultural output and profits across the U.S. and found that the impact is very heterogeneous, with gains and losses predicted for different regions. Chay and Greenstone (2003, 2005) showed that deterioration of air quality leads to an increase in infant mortality and reduction in housing prices.
2 Copeland and Taylor (1995) showed that free trade agreements among countries with strongly heterogeneous incomes lead to a redistribution of pollution from rich to poor countries and may lead to an increase in the world level of pollution.
The behavior of players with heterogeneous technologies in an environment with dynamic costs of climate change is studied in this paper employing a laboratory experiment.
Laboratory experiments are particularly suitable to the study of behavior and strategic interactions in this setting because, compared to field data, we have complete knowledge and control of environmental variables and the incentive structure of the mechanism. We are also able to study the effect of experience by giving the decision-makers the opportunity to start a second dynamic sequence "from scratch." Subjects in our experiment may represent countries facing the choice between moderating their economic growth with sustainable levels of pollution or pursuing myopic self-interest and facing the accumulating long-run costs of climate change. We study the correspondence of observed behavior with the benchmark theoretical predictions, specifically the Markov perfect equilibrium and social optimum. We also investigate behavioral response to heterogeneous technologies.
The problem of dynamic externalities in the context of slowly reversible climate change and accumulating costs of pollution has been addressed in a number of theoretical contributions.
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Related to this literature is theoretical work on management of dynamic common pool resources.
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In these models, as expected, the laissez-faire Nash equilibrium leads to overpollution or overuse of a common pool resource, and a variety of self-enforcing institutions are proposed to shift the equilibrium to follow a sustainable scenario. It is, however, unclear to what extent such models can be relied upon for policy. A number of laboratory and field experimental studies found that behavioral considerations may lead to substantial deviations from theoretical equilibrium predictions in nondynamic environmental and common-pool resource problems, supporting laboratory experiments as a natural complementary research method to theory and field studies.
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The behavior of agents in the presence of dynamic externalities has been studied experimentally in the context of individual management of renewable resources (Hey et al. 2009 ), collective management of common pool resources, 6 markets for tradable pollution permits, 7 and intergenerational transfers (Saijo et al. 2009 ). Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin (2010) study the behavior of agents in a dynamic game with pollution acting as an accumulating public bad. In their study they focus on the effects of environmental context and termination uncertainty. In this paper, we use a setting similar to Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin (2010) to analyze the impact of pollution propensity and heterogeneity of players' production technologies.
Our setting is economically different from that of a dynamically renewable common pool resource (CPR). In a CPR context, agents receive private benefit by drawing from the CPR, while in the dynamic climate change context agents' private activity contributes to the costly and slowly decaying stock of pollution. This is also a key difference from Battaglini et al. (2010) who investigate alternative political mechanisms in the provision of a durable public good. In their model, the agents face a choice between a private consumption good and contribution to a dynamic public good. In our setting, agents choose between a private consumption good and a private production allocation which generates production revenue but also contributes to a dynamic public bad. While Battaglini et al.
apply their model to durable public goods such as national defense and public infrastructure, our results are more applicable to a dynamic environment with costs of pollution and climate change. Perhaps the closest to our setting, other than Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin (2010) , is the work of Saijo et al. (2009) ; however, our focus is different. Saijo et al. (2009) study the effect of intergenerational information and utility transfers in a dynamic environment with a public bad; we are interested in the impact of pollution propensity and technological heterogeneity.
In this paper we study the role of technological heterogeneity in an environment with dynamic climate change without any additional enforcement mechanisms. In our experiment, subjects make decisions in fixed groups for an indefinite number of time periods. In each time period, there is a small probability that the game will end.
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Subjects decide on the amount of production input that generates private revenue and contributes to the accumulating common stock of costly pollution. There are three treatments with different configurations of subjects' technological parameters, specifically, the emission propensities. In the benchmark homogeneous treatment, subjects' emission factors, defined as emissions generated per unit of production input, are the same. In the unfavorable heterogeneous treatment, higher emission factors are introduced for half of the population and the average emission factor is relatively large. In the favorable heterogeneous treatment emission factors for half of the players are lower than the benchmark, so the average emission factor is relatively small.
We find that in all treatments subjects' production behavior is between the Nash 8 For a discussion of games with random termination see, e.g., Dal Bó (2005). Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin (2010) study the effect of random termination in a setting similar to the one used in the present paper and find no significant effect of termination uncertainty, with the exception of the end-game effect in the last few periods of their fixed-end treatment, without experience. With experience, however, subjects adjusted their behavior substantially in the direction of more cooperation in the fixed-end treatment, whereas in the random termination treatment no effect of experience was found. equilibrium and socially optimal allocations. In the unfavorable heterogeneous treatment subjects dramatically change their behavior with experience and manage to reach the same payoff levels as in the baseline homogeneous treatment, and the same pollution levels as in the favorable heterogeneous treatment. In the other two treatments, there is no significant effect of experience. Our results suggest that under relatively favorable conditions heterogeneous countries are less likely to achieve sustainability without external enforcement. At the same time, under unfavorable conditions the impending common threat of significant damage leads to higher levels of voluntary cooperation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical model and formulate its benchmark predictions. Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures. The experimental results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 contains a discussion and concluding remarks.
The model
There is a number of theoretical papers developing the dynamic models of pollution and environmental damage (Dutta and Radner, 2004 , Heal and Tarui, 2008 , Bretschger and Smulders, 2007 , Breton, Sbragia and Zaccour, 2008 , Mason, Polasky and Tarui, 2008 , Pindyck, 2009 ). Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin (2010) use a simplified version of a combination of some of these models in their experiment. We present below a modification of the model used by Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin (2009) to account for heterogeneity in players' technologies, which is the main focus of this paper.
There are n risk-neutral players indexed by i. In period t player i has endowment m and chooses production input x it ∈ [0, m], which yields a production revenue ax it , where a > 1 is the productivity parameter. Production in period t generates emissions
where q i is the technology or emission factor of i.
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Emissions lead to pollution; we denote by Y t the pollution level at the end of period t and it evolves as
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the persistence (retention rate) of pollution, and γY t−1 is the level of pollution at the beginning of period t.
b > 0 is the cost of unit of pollution.
In each period there is a continuation probability β ∈ (0, 1) that there will be a next period. Correspondingly, (1 − β) represents the termination probability. The resulting dynamic game is played until termination occurs, and each player's total payoff is the sum of payoffs obtained in all periods until termination. Each participant is maximizing expected total payoff. For theoretical predictions, we restrict attention to two benchmark solution concepts -the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (henceforth, NE) and social optimum (henceforth, SO). The latter is defined as the profile of inputs {x it } that maximizes the expected sum of total payoffs of all players. The results are summarized in the following two propositions (all proofs are in Appendix A).
Proposition 1. The NE profile of inputs for a player with emission factor q i is to choose
Proposition 2. The SO profile of inputs for a player with emission factor q i is to choose
Due to the linearity of the problem, the optimal profiles of inputs have a simple threshold structure: The players with a high enough emission factor choose zero input, while the players with a low enough emission factor input their entire endowment. As expected,q S <q N . Thus, it can be shown that the NE input and pollution levels are, generally, higher, and aggregate payoffs lower than the SO ones.
According to Propositions 1 and 2, both the NE and SO input profiles have the form x it = 0 or x it = m in all time periods depending on whether the emission factor of player i is below or above the corresponding threshold value.
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Without loss of generality, suppose that the emission factors of players are ordered so that q 1 ≤ q 2 ≤ . . . ≤ q n . Then, there exists an integerī, with 0 ≤ī ≤ n, generally different for the NE and SO cases, such that x it = m for i ≤ī and x it = 0 for i >ī. For a threshold emission factorq,ī is determined as the maximal i such that q i ≤q.
Proposition 3. (i) The expected total payoff of players i ≤ī is
(ii) The expected total payoff of players i >ī is
(iii) The expected total cost of pollution is
.
(iv) The expected total payoff of the society as a whole is strictly greater, and the expected total cost of pollution strictly lower in the SO scenario than in the NE scenario if there is at least one i such thatq S < q i <q N .
3 Experimental design and procedures
Treatments and hypotheses
The experimental design follows closely the model presented above. Our main treatment variable is the propensity to pollute represented by emission factors. We construct three treatments by varying the emission factors and introduce the non-mean-preserving heterogeneity in pollution propensity. For all treatments, we chose the following parameter values: n = 2, m = 10, a = 5, b = 1, γ = 0.75, β = 0.95. The theoretical threshold emission factors for these parameter values areq N = 1.6 andq S = 0.8. The configurations of the players' emission factors (q 1 , q 2 ) by treatment are: (1) the homogeneous treatment, or baseline (1, 1); (2) the high-emissions heterogeneous treatment (1, 1.25); (3) the lowemissions heterogeneous treatment (1, 0.75). The experimental design as well as the NE and SO predictions for input levels in each treatment are summarized in ment and simplify coordination. The dynamic nature of the game implies that decisions in earlier rounds affect the environment in later rounds, therefore, to test for the effect of experience, each session consisted of two parts. Subjects started the first sequence of decisions in the environment described above. Upon termination of the sequence, subjects were informed that they would participate in another sequence in an identical environment while remaining in the same group. For the second part, subjects were restarted with the first round parameters (zero pollution) and their earnings from the second part were added to their earnings from the first part.
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We proceed with the analysis reporting data for both parts and, for each part, choose the minimum number of periods across treatments for consistency.
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Our main hypotheses address the correspondence of behavior with theoretical predictions and comparison across treatments. We focus on three key characteristics: production input choice, and the resulting pollution and payoffs. Figure 1 illustrates theoretical predictions for the dynamics of inputs (left panel), resulting pollution (center panel) and payoffs (right panel). While two theoretical benchmarks are NE and SO, we conjecture that the observed behavior is likely between these two benchmarks.
The NE pollution levels are highest in (1, 1.25), followed by (1, 1) and (1, 0.75), as expected. We conjecture that the ranking of observed pollution levels corresponds with theory. Interestingly, while the SO pollution level is zero in (1, 1) and (1, 1.25), it is positive in (1, 0.75) since it is optimal for the player with the low emission factor, 0.75, to invest m in production. It is possible that if the observed behavior is consistently closer to the SO instead of NE for all treatments, such ranking of pollution levels might be observed, however we find this unlikely. The NE payoffs ranking is the opposite, with the highest in (1, 0.75), followed by (1, 1) and (1, 1.25) respectively. The ranking is weakly preserved for the SO solutions where payoffs are highest for (1, 0.75), followed by coinciding (1, 1)
11 Subjects did not know ex ante that there will be two parts in the experiment. 12 Four random continuation sequences were repeated between treatments. and (1, 1.25). Our hypothesis for payoffs is that the ranking of payoffs is preserved.
Procedures
The experiment took place in the XS/FS laboratory at Florida State University. All decisions were made via computer interface using Z-tree (Fischbacher 2007) . Subjects were volunteers from the population of undergraduate students at FSU recruited through an online announcement system. Each subject participated in the experiment only once. Subjects were randomly assigned to groups, remained in the same group for the entire sequence of decisions and were unaware of the identities of other group members. Experimental instructions were read out loud, with a paper copy distributed to subjects to follow. The instructions explained the nature of the game in neutral terms (see Appendix B). After the instructions, subjects were guided through a sample round of decisions with the interface, and filled out a paper-based questionnaire to make sure they understand how the game works. The experimenters checked each subject's questionnaire individually.
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Each session lasted about 90 minutes, with subjects earning about $20 on average, including a $10 show-up fee. 
Results

Production inputs
The NE production inputs are the same across treatments and types, while the SO allocations are the same for both players in treatments (1, 1.25) and (1, 1), but different between the two types in treatment (1, 0.75). We therefore first test for the difference in behavior between types.
Figure 8 in Appendix C presents production input decisions for all types and the associated standard errors. Although in treatments (1, 1.25) and (1, 0.75) there can potentially be a difference in behavior between player types, in both treatments the types are practically indistinguishable. Except for few periods, there are no significant differences in average production inputs between players with q = 1 and q = 1.25 in treatment (1, 1.25) , and between players with q = 1 and q = 0.75 in treatment (1, 0.75). Therefore, from this point on we pool different player types within each treatment.
Result 1: There are no differences in behavior across types within the same treatment. Table 3 . The comparison is made using a simple t-test using group-level standard errors and the fact that observations are independent across treatments.
As seen from Figure 2 , and confirmed by the results in Table 3 , there is no significant difference in production inputs between treatments (1, 1) and (1, 0.75). In treatment (1, 1.25), subjects start out with roughly the same levels of inputs, but already by period 8 in part 1, subjects lower their production inputs substantially, as compared to the other two treatments. In part 2, the inputs in treatment (1, 1.25) are much lower than in the other two treatments in all periods.
In part 1, inputs are relatively stable over time in all treatments. In part 2, however, they initially follow a downward trend but then experience a steady upward trend throughout.
14 Overall, inputs are about the same in part 2 as in part 1 in treatments (1, 1) and (1, 0.75), and lower in part 2 than in part 1 in treatment (1, 1.25).
Compared to the theoretical predictions, input levels are relatively close to the NE levels in treatments (1, 1) and (1, 0.75), especially at the end of part 2. In part 2 of treatment (1, 1.25), the inputs are roughly halfway between the SO and NE levels.
Result 2: Production input levels are lower than the NE but higher than the SO in all treatments. In treatment (1, 1.25), the input levels are lowest starting from period 7 of part 1; furthermore, in part 2 they are approximately halfway between the SO and NE levels. Table 4 . The comparison is made using a simple t-test using group-level standard errors and the fact that observations are independent across treatments.
Pollution
In part 1, pollution levels in treatments (1, 1) and (1, 1.25) are practically the same and higher than in treatment (1, 0.75). This is consistent with previous observation of indistinguishable production decisions in treatments (1, 1) and (1, 0.75) but lower production inputs in (1, 1.25). In part 2, however, the lowest amount of pollution is generated in treatment (1, 1.25) and it is significantly different until the very end when treatment
(1, 0.75) catches up with it. This result, of course, is due to the drastic reduction in production inputs in part 2 of treatment (1, 1.25).
In terms of dynamics, in part 1 towards the later periods pollution flattens in all treatments. However, in part 2 there is a steady upward trend, also consistent with increasing production inputs. The change between parts 1 and 2 is especially pronounced for treatment (1, 1.25) . In that treatment, in part 1 subjects start with relatively high levels of pollution going even above those of treatment (1, 1) until period 7. At that point, a structural break happens and the level of pollution stabilizes, albeit still higher than in treatment (1, 0.75). Starting from part 2, however, subjects coordinate on much lower levels of pollution but increase it at a steady rate.
Comparing to the theoretical predictions, the results, as expected from the previous section, are between the NE and SO levels.
Result 3: Pollution is between the NE and SO levels in all treatments. In part 1, the levels of pollution are the same for treatments (1, 1) and (1, 1.25) and lower for treatment (1, 0.75). With experience, in part 2, treatment (1, 1.25) has the lowest pollution due to strong adjustment of production behavior. The solid lines in Figure 4 show the NE and SO per capita payoffs. Note that, unlike in the other two treatments, in treatment (1, 0.75) the SO payoffs are very different between the player types. In this treatment, the utilitarian social optimum prescribes that the high-pollution player contributes zero and the low-pollution player contributes m as their production input in all periods (see Table 1 ). The resulting payoffs are highly asymmetric, with the average per capita payoff maximized by this configuration. We do not expect subjects to be guided by the utilitarian social optimum in this case, however, as there is no institution providing an opportunity for transfers between players. The SO per capita payoff curve in Figure 4 , thus, only shows the maximal theoretically attainable benchmark.
Figure 7 in Appendix C shows the experimental results separately, with group-level error bars. The results of period-by-period pairwise comparisons between treatments (1, 1), (1, 1.25) and (1, 0.75) are shown in Table 5 . The comparison is made using a simple t-test using group-level standard errors and the fact that observations are independent across treatments.
As seen from Table 5 , in all periods cumulative payoffs are the highest in treatment
(1, 0.75) and the lowest in treatment (1, 1.25), with treatment (1, 1) in between. While in part 1 the gap in payoffs between the treatments is widening, consistently with NE, in part 2 the cumulative payoffs in treatment (1, 1.25) reach those of treatment (1, 1) by period 35 (period 15 of part 2). Treatment (1, 1.25) is the one where the change in behavior between part 1 and part 2 allowed subjects to strike the balance between pollution and production and reach approximately the same payoff levels as in the more advantageous treatment (1, 1). Treatment (1, 1.25) is also the only treatment where some subjects reached negative payoffs in part 1 (counting off of the initial balance of 250; subjects never actually had a negative balance).
Result 4: In part 1, the ranking of payoffs is consistent with the NE, while subjects' payoffs are higher than the NE in all treatments. In part 2, payoffs in treatment (1, 1.25) reach the same level as (1, 1).
Dynamics of production decisions
In this section, we explore the dynamics of subjects' production decisions. Let x it denote the production input of player i in period t, x other it -the production input of the other member of player i's group in period t, Y it -the pollution level in player i's group at the end of period t. We estimate the following population model:
Here, α 0 , ρ, α 1 and α 2 are the model coefficients, c i is the individual-specific unobserved effect, u it is the zero-mean idiosyncratic error term. In model (5), it is assumed that a player's decision in period t has a persisting dynamic component and also depends on the other player's decision and the level of pollution in the previous period. The unobserved effect c i captures time-constant subject-specific factors that may affect decisions, such as the degree of cooperativeness or cognitive ability. Model (5) allows us to isolate three features in subjects' dynamic investment decisions: persistence, measured by coefficient ρ, reciprocity, measured by coefficient α 1 , and concern for the group as a whole, measured by coefficient α 2 . Reciprocity here is understood as a consequence of inequity-aversion: if the other player is willing to sacrifice part of shortrun payoff by allocating less to production, a positively reciprocating player will follow by also reducing her input. If, however, the other player increases her production input, a positively reciprocating player will increase production as well. Concern for the group as a whole, on the other hand, is high if coefficient α 2 is negative. It can be partly driven (5), by treatment. Estimation is performed using the Arellano-Bond estimator. The second and third lags of the dependent and predetermined variables are used as instruments for the differenced equation. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** -1%, ** -5%, * -10%.
by the subject's desire to signal to the other player that it will be beneficial for both of them to reduce production. In conjunction with positive reciprocity this behavior may lead to cooperative outcomes. Estimation of model (5) by fixed or random effects would not be consistent due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable and the predetermined variable Y i,t−1 (Wooldridge 2002 , Arellano 2003 ). An appropriate estimator in this case is the ArellanoBond estimator for dynamic panel data models, which uses first-differencing to remove the unobserved effect and then estimates the differenced model by GMM using further lags of the dependent variable and predetermined variables as instruments (see, e.g., Arellano
2003).
The results of the estimation for part 1 and part 2 in each treatment are presented in Table 2 . As seen from Table 2 , there are differences in dynamics between treatments. In part 1, conditional on the other factors, positive persistence in own inputs and positive reciprocity in the form of response to the other player's input are present in treatments (1,1) and (1,1.25) but not in treatment (1,0.75). In the latter treatment, however, subjects exhibit the strongest positive response to the overall pollution level. Interestingly, there is no response to pollution level in treatment (1,1) and a negative response to pollution level in treatment (1,1.25). Thus, part 1 of treatment (1,1.25) is the only treatment in which subjects reduced their inputs (and emissions) in response to an increase in pollution. We note that initially pollution was growing at a faster rate in part 1 of (1, 1.25) imposing costs on the whole group. Together with positive reciprocity, this explains the stabilization of pollution at the end of part 1 and the lower starting levels of production in part 2 in that treatment.
In part 2, the coefficients on Y i,t−1 are positive and significant in all treatments. In treatment (1,1.25), this is understandable because the initial levels of pollution are much lower than in part 1. Overall, the dynamic behavior in part 2 of treatment (1,1.25)
indicates no persistence and no reciprocity, conditional on other factors. At the same time, both persistence and reciprocity arise in treatment (1,0.75); and persistence but not reciprocity arises in treatment (1,1). In part 2, the coefficient on pollution is positive and significant reflecting the upward trend in production inputs and pollution.
The results allow us to conjecture that the drastic reduction in production inputs and pollution in treatment (1,1.25) is caused by the experience of equally shared high costs of pollution that was not present in the other two treatments. Once the pollution level was reduced, however, the dynamics in behavior in treatment (1,1.25) became similar to the treatment with the lowest level of pollution in part 1.
We conclude that the reduction in pollution in treatment (1,1.25) can be explained by the simultaneous presence of positive reciprocity and experience of high public costs of pollution in part 1 in that treatment. In treatment (1,1), reciprocity was present but there was no group association, and neither of the two factors was present in treatment (1,0.75).
Discussion and conclusions
We report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the role of technological heterogeneity in an environment with dynamic costs of pollution. The effect of heterogeneity is important for international environmental agreements between countries that are at different stages of technological development and face tradeoffs between short-term economic growth and long-term global environmental sustainability. In this paper we focus on the benchmark aspects of behavior in the absence of pollution-mitigating institutions.
We conducted three treatments corresponding to different configurations of technological heterogeneity. In treatment (1,1), both players have the same emission factor.
In treatment (1,1.25), half of the population has a relatively high emission factor, or, in other words, the overall level of environmental technological development is relatively low. In treatment (1,0.75), half of the population has a relatively low emission factor, or the overall level of environmentally friendly technological development is relatively high. As the benchmark theoretical predictions, we use the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (NE) and the social optimum (SO). We conduct two sequences of decisions to test for the effect of experience. In this dynamic environment early mistakes affect the path of state variables, so the second sequence where subjects restart "from scratch" allows them to experience the effect of refined strategies from the beginning of the game.
We find that production and pollution are below the NE but above the SO levels in all treatments. This finding indicates that, unsurprisingly, pollution-mitigating institutions are necessary to solve the social dilemma between local economic growth and global environmental sustainability. We do not observe any differences in behavior between subject types in heterogeneous treatments. This confirms concerns that developing countries would likely not curb emissions at the expense of production and suggests that in the absence of enforcement mechanisms countries with different pollution abatement technologies would not adjust their production according to the environmental damage they generate, and the more polluting countries may follow with pollution reduction only if the less polluting countries lead. This result is in line with some of the observed behavior of developing countries. Thus, the overall level of technological development, as reflected by the average emission factor, is more important to curb pollution levels than the development of individual members. Programs reducing the barriers to access to clean technologies by less developed countries and the leading role of developed countries with environmentally clean technologies appear to be promising in addressing the problem.
In the benchmark (1,1) and high emission (1,1.25) treatments, in the first part subjects do not reach even the minimal level of sustainability, defined as nondecreasing cumulative payoffs. In the favorable heterogeneous treatment, (1,0.75), sustainability is reached in both the first and second parts. In treatment (1,1.25), however, subjects adjust their behavior by reducing production in the end of part 1 and in part 2 where nondecreasing payoffs are reached.
Strong differences in behavior between the first and second parts are only observed in the high pollution propensity heterogeneous treatment, (1,1.25). Here, in the first part subjects start off performing much worse than in the other two treatments (in terms of payoffs), which is consistent with the NE. However, after several periods they curb their emissions and by the end of the first part reach the same level of pollution as in treatment (1,1). Moreover, in the second part subjects curb their emissions even more, ultimately generating the same amount of pollution as in treatment (1,0.75), and significantly lower than in treatment (1,1). The resulting payoffs in the second part in treatment (1,1.25) are at the same level as in treatment (1,1). We analyze the dynamics of individual subjects' decisions to gain additional insights into the reasons for the difference between treatment (1,1.25) and the other two treatments. We find that, unlike in the other two treatments, the dynamics in part 1 of treatment (1,1.25) is characterized by the joint presence of positive reciprocity and production inputs reduction in response to an increase in the level pollution. These two behavioral responses and the large costs of pollution experienced at the beginning of part 1 lead to stabilization of pollution at the end of part 1 and the drastic coordinated reduction of production and pollution at the beginning of part 2. Thus, the presence of high public costs of pollution leads not only to a reduction in pollution levels, but also to qualitative differences in the dynamics of decisions.
We conclude that under unfavorable conditions countries are more likely to curb emissions and reach sustainability, but only with experience. This result is somewhat unfortunate, because, in light of the new findings about the irreversibility of climate change (Solomon et al. 2010) , experience and second trial may not be available in the field. At the same time, our results indicate that, somewhat counterintuitively, environmental regulation is more necessary in the presence of a moderate damage than in the presence of a more obvious damage. In the latter case, the results of continuing "business as usual" are too obvious to ignore, while in the former case the relatively slow and subtle buildup of pollution costs may be insufficient to cause adjustments in behavior. The results also indicate that subjects substantially adjust their behavior only when they are faced with negative payoffs, which is not a practical or acceptable solutions in the field in a sense of requiring a threat of extinction to induce dramatic adjustments without external enforcement institutions.
Previous literature on public goods suggests that two-and even three-person groups often reach high levels of cooperation without communication or enforcement institutions. However, in our case cooperation is not present even in two-person group. To the extent it is less likely to be closer to social optimum in larger groups, our results represent the lower bound of possible consequences of the laissez-faire approach to this problem, supporting the concerns and observed difficulties in curbing global pollution and climate change.
The analysis presented here is a step towards understanding the behavior of agents and the need for institutions in an environment with costs of dynamic slowly reversible climate change. Our setting serves as a testbed for future experiments addressing natural extensions, such as the effects of investments in sustainable technologies, communication, group size, and endogenously emerging as well as exogenous regulatory institutions. 
A Proofs of propositions A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
It is straightforward to show that, with pollution evolving according to Eq. (1) and
Suppose player i reached period t of the game and accumulated payoffΠ i,t−1 by the beginning of that period. Then the expected total payoff of player i in period t, conditional upon reaching that period, can be written as
Here, the first term is determined entirely by the history of actions of player i and other players, while the second term is the expected payoff from future actions of player i and other players.
The latter term can be re-written as
Here, we separated the sum containing the emission levels, cf. Eq. (6), into the parts related to the periods before and after period t. Within each emission level, we separated the emissions created by player i from the emissions created by other players. Equation (7) is the value function to be optimized over the stream of inputs x is , s ≥ t, to find the best response of player i. Following the definition of the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium, we assume that player i's optimal action in period t does not depend on her own and other players' choices in the previous periods.
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The best response then can be determined by maximizing the part of the value function containing x is , s ≥ t, treating x is as variables. This part has the form
Note that the double sum pertaining to the second term in (8) can be transformed as
which finally gives the value function in the form
This is a linear function of the stream of inputs x ik , k ≥ t. Each input is restricted to the range x ik ∈ [0, m], and the coefficient at x ik in the sum (9) is the same for all k. Therefore, the optimum will be reached at either x ik = m or x ik = 0 for all k ≥ t. The result depends on the value of the impact factor q i of player i. For q i >q N , withq N defined by Eq. (3), player i's optimal input is zero, whereas for q i <q N the optimal input is m. Finally, for q i =q N the value function is zero and the player is indifferent among all input levels between zero and m.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
To find the socially optimal outcome, we maximize the expected sum of all players' total payoffs. The relevant part of
This expression is to be maximized over x ik for all i and k ≥ t. Note that n j=1 q j x jl is independent of i, therefore the outer summation over i will produce factor n, and the entire expression reduces to
This expression has the same structure as (8), except for the summation over i and factor n in the second term. The result is that all players with q i >q S (q i <q S ) should input zero (m), withq S =q N /n defined by Eq. (4).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
For a player with i ≤ī, payoff in period t conditional on reaching that period is
and the total expected payoff is
Similarly, for for a player with i >ī, payoff in period t conditional on reaching that period is
The second term in both expressions represents the expected total cost of pollution, C. Finally, the expected total payoff per member of the society is the weighted average of the last two expressions with weightsī/n and 1 −ī/n, which gives
Letī N andī S denote the threshold player corresponding to, respectively, the NE and SO scenarios. It is always the case thatī N ≥ī S , but we additionally assume thatī N >ī S , i.e. there is at least one player who chooses input of m in the NE case but input of zero in the SO case. The difference between the SO and NE average payoffs can then be written asΠ
The last expression is positive because the average emission factor among playersī S + 1, . . . ,ī N is greater thanq S ≡ qī S , which proves part (v) of the proposition.
B Instructions
Thank you for participating in today's experiment. During the experiment you will make decisions and may earn money. Your earnings may depend on your own decisions and the decisions of other participants. You will receive $10 show-up fee plus whatever earnings you will make during the experiment. All amounts are expressed in tokens. The exchange rate is 100 tokens = $1. At the end of the experiment your total earnings in tokens will be exchanged into dollars and cents and added to your $10 show-up fee. You will be given a check for the total amount in private. No other participant will be informed about your payment.
At the beginning of the experiment all participants will be randomly divided into groups and stay in the same group for the entire sequence of decisions. The experiment will consist of a series of decision-making rounds. You will be given an initial balance of 250 tokens. Decision At the beginning of each round you will be endowed with 10 tokens. You can allocate these 10 tokens between two options: keep and invest. Therefore possible allocations (keep, invest) are (0,10), (1,9), (8,2), (4,6) and so on.
Production Each token you invest yields you 5 tokens of production revenue. Invested tokens of all members of your group lead to accumulation of a common stock. Specifically, invested tokens of each member are multiplied by this member's common stock impact factor and added to the common stock. For example, if the member's impact factor is 1 then invested tokens are simply added to the common stock. If the impact factor is 0.75 then invested tokens decreased by 25% are added to the common stock.
Each group member has to pay maintenance cost proportional to the total size of the common stock. The cost of maintaining each unit of the common stock is 1 token. The maintenance cost each round is based on the size of the common stock at the beginning of this round. The size of the common stock at the beginning of the first round is zero. At the end of each round total group investments multiplied by corresponding impact factors are added to the common stock.
Only part of current common stock is transferred to the next rounds, specifically common stock retention rate is .75 or 75% meaning that 3 4 of the common stock at the end of the current round will be the level of the common stock at the beginning of the next round.
Payoffs Your earnings for each round are obtained by adding the number of tokens you decided to keep and production revenue to your balance while subtracting the common stock maintenance cost from your balance. This part of the experiment may consist of several rounds and your balance will be updated after every round as described above.
After each round there will be some chance that the decision-making will stop. The likelihood of next round is equal to .95 or 95% and the likelihood that this round was the last is .05 or 5%. You can think of it as rolling a 20-sided die and if any number from 2 to 20 comes up, the next round happens, while if number 1 comes up, the experiment stops. Your earnings would be your balance in the last round. You will see the draw after every round.
Practice We will now illustrate the interface of the program and show you the decision screens. Please wait for instructions to make decisions.
All subjects will be randomly divided into groups of 2 and stay in the same group for the sequence of decision rounds. 
